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ABSTRACT
This paper traces the development of Lesotho's wool 
and mohair marketing system from one dominated by the 
private sector in the pre-Independence period to one 
dominated by government marketing in the post- 
Independence era. It seeks to assess what practices or 
market structures generated the longstanding Basotho 
antipathy towards private sector marketing and concludes 
that the pre-Independence structure could be 
characterized as one of "duo-trading", a situation which 
exists when a trader has a relative monopsony in the 
purchase of agricultural produce from farmers and a 
relative monopoly in the sale of consumer goods to 
farmers. Evidence suggests that traders did not normally 
exploit their monopsony position in the purchase of wool 
and mohair. Prices paid were approximately those paid on 
a competitive market. Instead, with the aid of high 
sales receipts, they took advantage of their monopoly 
position to extract higher profits in the sale of 
consumer goods. Unfortunately, government attempts to 
reform the marketing structure have failed to take 
account of the duo-trading structure and have assumed 
that only a monopsony position prevailed. As a result, 
they have had little impact on the returns to traders, 
except perhaps to raise them. As far as farmers are 
concerned, government intervention has resulted in a 
dualistic shearing and sales pattern. Farmers with 
disproportionately large flocks tend to shear at 
government woolsheds where a variety of implicit 
government subsidies augment their wool and mohair 
incomes. Smaller farmers, preferring the immediate cash 
payments made by traders, pay full, unsubsidized costs 
and receive relatively lower incomes as a result.
Although the present government-private marketing 
structure operates reasonably well, there are a number of 
inefficiencies (in addition to inequities) which ought to 
be addressed by government policy makers. This paper 
makes some suggestions for overcoming some of these
problems. This is followed by the outline of a proposal 
for a more wide ranging restructuring of the wool and 
mohair marketing system.
I. Introduction
For over 80 years, wool and mohair sales have 
provided Lesotho with its largest exports and with its 
largest domestically-generated sources of income. 
Presently, fleeces are marketed through any of three 
outlets: private traders, a government-sponsored
marketing agent, or, illegally, through smugglers. With 
the exception of some of the smugglers' purchases, all of 
the wool and mohair is sold on world markets through a 
South African farmers' marketing co-operative under the 
auspices of the South African Wool and Mohair Boards.
The proportion of the clip which is marketed through each 
outlet varies from year to year depending on the level of 
world prices and on the relative effectiveness of the 
outlets in responding to stockowners' marketing needs.
This marketing system has evolved in response to 
real or perceived problems with pre-existing systems. In 
addition to private-sector marketing, Lesotho has 
experimented with co-operative societies, parastatal 
corporations, and government marketing/regulating 
departments. Some of these institutions have been more 
successful than others. Since all but a tiny portion of 
Lesotho's clip is marketed in South Africa, this 
evolution has had to respond to initiatives from this 
source as well as from domestic concerns.
Evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the present system suggest that there is room for 
additional adjustment and change. In addition, market 
structure analysis indicates that the private trading 
sector has been incorrectly characterized and, 
consequently, that past reforms have inadequately 
addressed problems in this area. This paper outlines 
these evaluations and analyses and seeks to draw 
implications from them for continued institutional and 
policy reform. As well, it may have relevance to a more 
general analysis of agricultural marketing problems in 
Lesotho.
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II. Historical Background
Wool production in Lesotho began in the 1850s, 
barely 20 years after the foundijig of the nation by 
Moshoeshoe I . Basotho acquired wooled Merino sheep 
through labour migration and employment on South African 
sheep farms and, sometimes, through stock theft. Wool 
prices were high at this time and contemporary reports 
agree that the principal motivation for this acquisition 
was the cash income to be gained from wool sales. The 
initiation of mohair production lagged behind that of 
wool production by about 20 years. By the end of the 
19th Century, however, almost all of the sheep flock and 
most of the goat flock had been transformed from 
traditional meat producing varieties to the exotic Merino 
sheep and Angora goat breeds.
This commercialisation of small stock keeping 
parallels a similar upsurge of commercial grain 
production by the Basotho. This grain found ready 
markets in the neighboring Orange Free State and in the 
South African diamond and gold fields. By the 1870s, 
Lesotho was becoming well integrated into the Southern 
African market economy and was widely described as 
prosperous. By this time, traders had established over 
70 trading stations where the growing agricultural 
surplus was exchanged for manufactured consumer goods and 
farm implements. By the 1890s, an additional 50 stations 
had been established.
Competition with cheap Australian and American 
grain, as well as South African imposts against Lesotho's 
grain exports, severely limited Lesotho's grain exports. 
In response, the Basotho turned increasingly to the 
complementary pursuits of labour migration and wool and 
mohair production. Between 1900 and 1931, the Merino 
population increased 10 times— from 300,000 to almost 
three million. The Angora population increased by a 
similar factor from about 100,000 to over one million.
As a result of a combination of severe drought, world
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economic depression-induced falls in wool and mohair 
prices, and substantial range degradation from 
overgrazing, sheep and goat populations fell by one half 
between 1931 and 1937. Total small ruminant numbers have 
remained more or less constant ever since.
Ill. Evolution of the Marketing System
The marketing structure seems initially to have been 
highly competitive with many small traders and itinerant 
hawkers competing for the farmers' business. Following 
the Gun War of 1880-81 between the Basotho and the 
decade-old colonial administration, when a number of 
traders fled the country or sold their licenses, the 
trading structure became markedly more concentrated as 
some traders acquired the licenses and stations of 
others. In 1920, one trader, Frasers, owned 46 percent 
of the trading stations in the three most populous 
lowland districts. Several other traders also had 
multiple stations and dominated trade in particular 
locales. This pattern has persisted. In the 1980s, 
Frasers had about one third of the private licenses for 
wool and mohair purchases.
Providing a measure of competition to the trading 
stations were the hawkers, or itinerant traders. 
Initially, although they could not establish permanent 
trading stations, they were not restricted as to what 
they could buy and sell. Because of transport 
constraints, however, they invariably bought and sold in 
small lots and operated mostly in the remote areas 
distant from trading stations. Often in the first few 
decades of the 20th Century, there were four times as 
many licensed hawkers as traders. Hawkers were often 
Indian, mixed race, or Basotho, in contrast to traders, 
who were invariably white. Compared to trading, capital 
requirements for hawking were relatively low. Profits 
were lower, as well. By the 1950s, the authorities 
attempted to control more closely the classing of fleeces
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and hawking declined as hawkers were forbidden to trade 
in wool and mohair.
Traders occupied a relative monopoly-monopsony 
position in their trading locale. The following factors, 
inherent in the nature of the business or the specific 
conditions of the trade, contributed to this:
1. Transport was difficult, time-consuming, and 
expensive owing to the very mountainous terrain.
This limited farmers' ability to "shop around" with 
their clip (if clipped at home) or with their flocks 
(if clipped at the trader's station). Nonetheless, 
contemporary reports from the 1920s to the 1960s 
suggest that some of this was done (Biggs, 1964; 
Stutley, 1960; Pirn, 1935; Sayce, 1924).
2. Capital requirements and risk were high. Traders 
had to provide wool and mohair storage and classing 
facilities and had to advance payment to farmers in 
anticipation of sales at uncertain prices on the 
world market. One analyst estimated that in 1958 a 
capital investment of M110,000 (1958 prices) was 
required for these purposes (Stutley, 1960: 233).
In addition to these "natural" constraints on 
competition, traders pursued several "rent-seeking" 
constraints. Principal of these was:
3. Restrictive licensing. As early as 1890, the 
Basutoland Traders Association (BTA) was formed to 
lobby government on its behalf. It sought to limit 
the entry of Indian traders into the business, 
fearing the "unfair" competition of the allegedly 
narrower Indian trading margins. As a result,
Indian traders were largely confined to the Butha 
Buthe District. The BTA also sought to restrict the 
number of licenses granted for any one locale and to 
limit the number of new entrants into the industry. 
The government Licensing Board was for the most part 
sympathetic to these concerns of "over-trading" and 
"unfair competition" in its granting of licenses.
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Strict limits on the number of trading locations in 
population centres were set and Basotho and Indian 
traders were often denied licenses in these areas 
and granted them in the less desirable rural 
locales.
Finally, traders themselves adopted a number of trading 
practices which effectively limited competition. These 
included:
4. Provision of credit against commodity sales.
Farmers could purchase consumer goods on credit but 
had to pledge their output as collateral. Although 
this credit was often useful— even necessary— it did 
limit the ability of farmers to "shop around".
5. Payment with script or chits. Some traders would 
not pay cash but would give farmers chits against 
purchase of consumer goods in their store. This 
effectively bound the farmer to sales and purchases 
from the same trader.
6. Employment of touts to encourage producers to deal 
with a particular trader. Their impact was 
ambiguous, however, since they also acted as market 
intelligence agents and helped to advertise the 
prices offered by the various traders (Stutley,
1960 ) .
As a result of these factors or practices, there was a 
widespread belief amongst farmers that traders were 
taking advantage of them (see, e.g., testimony before the 
Basutoland National Council, 1964).
In the 1950s, government, seemingly at the urging of 
the Catholic Church (Stutley, 1960), encouraged the 
formation of co-operative societies to provide greater 
competition in the purchase of wool and mohair as well as 
to eliminate what was thought to be excessively high 
traders' margins. By 1958, 14 co-ops had been formed; 
however, they never handled more than 10 percent of the 
total clip. Although traders opposed these co-ops and 
sometimes practiced predatory pricing against them, their
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ultimate failure was more due to financial and managerial 
problems of their own making (Biggs, 1964). By the 
1960s, most societies had ceased to function.
Also in the 1950s, Government found it necessary to 
respond to Basotho demands for increased participation in 
trading. Although Basotho held a majority of restricted 
traders licenses (which forbade them to purchase wool and 
mohair), only 3 of 193 general trading licenses were held 
by Basotho in 1932. After 1953, no new licenses were 
issued to non-Basotho, although existing licenses could 
be transferred to anyone. By 1958, only 14 of 215 
general trading licenses were held by Basotho.
At Independence in 1966, Government felt compelled 
to respond to stock keepers' complaints with 
institutional reforms to the marketing structure.
Although private traders were not forbidden to purchase 
wool and mohair, the number of licenses was greatly 
restricted. In 1973, the parastatal Livestock Marketing 
Corporation (LMC) was established to buy wool and mohair 
through government-established shearing sheds in 
competition with private buyers. This was followed in 
1975 by Lesotho Mohair Industries (LMI) which sought to 
bypass South African markets and to sell directly to 
European buyers. Neither venture was successful owing to 
under-capitalization, lack of personnel and transport, 
and poor management. Large quantities of wool and mohair 
remained unpurchased and prices paid were sometimes lower 
than those offered on South African markets. Turmoil in 
the marketing system led some farmers to bypass official 
channels while others reportedly slaughtered many of 
their animals.
In 1978, the activities of LMC and LMI were 
terminated and many of their activities were undertaken 
by a section of the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Livestock and Livestock Products Marketing Services 
(LPMS), which continues to operate today. This 
organization has overcome the most glaring problems of
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its immediate predecessors and has achieved a high degree 
of acceptance by farmers. LPMS does not take possession 
of the clip but acts only as a marketing agent for 
farmers shearing at government woolsheds. In addition to 
this, it provides certain regulatory functions including 
the inspection of the facilities of private traders, the 
maintenance of classing standards and training of 
classers, inspection of scales, licensing of private 
traders, and, in conjunction with traders and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the determination of traders' 
prices and margins.
In 1971, South Africa instituted a one-channel 
marketing system whereby all wool and mohair, including 
Lesotho's, are marketed through the South African Wool 
and Mohair Boards with the farmers' marketing co­
operative, Boeremakelaars Koop BKP (BKB), acting as the 
sole broker. All wool and mohair is pooled by the boards 
and is sold by a dual-payment system by which farmers are 
given an advance payment (determined by the boards) 
before and a post-payment after final marketing. This 
permits all growers to share equally in high and low 
prices, regardless of when their fleeces are sold. A 
Stabilization Fund, financed by levies on growers, 
effectively establishes a floor price under sales. In 
addition, Lesotho is eligible for EEC STABEX assistance 
should its export earnings from wool or mohair fall below 
an agreed multi-year average. Lesotho received STABEX 
support for its mohair sales in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1987 
(personal communication, J. Mokotjo).
IV• The Structure of Private Trading; Duo-trading(1)
All changes made to the marketing structure to 
provide more competition in wool and mohair markets were 
predicated on two assumptions. The first was based on an 
assessment of the constraints to competition which
(I)This section is based on Mokitimi, 1988.
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suggested that traders were reaping monopsony (single 
purchaser) profits from wool and mohair purchases. The 
second equated high trading margins with high profits and 
was used to reinforce the first. Neither assumption was 
correct, however. The first was founded on an incomplete 
assessment of the market structure within which the 
trader operated. As a result of this, the true source of 
trader profit was not identified. The second incorrectly 
equated marketing margins with profit mark-ups and failed 
to identify the legitimate marketing costs that any 
marketing channel must bear.
As a result of these misconceptions, the changes 
made to the marketing structure have had little impact on 
traders' profits, except, perhaps, to increase them.
Nor, since there were few opportunities for cutting costs 
(but many opportunities for increasing them through 
marketing inefficiencies), did they have much impact on 
raising the prices paid to growers.
Although the factors listed above did, in fact, give 
the trader a (more or less effective) monopsony, there 
was one other factor of paramount importance: they also
had a (more or less effective) monopoly in the sale of 
consumer goods. Traders bought wool, mohair, and other 
agricultural produce; the farmers used the income gained 
to purchase consumer goods. If the trader did not buy, 
the farmer could not buy; the more the trader could pay, 
the more the farmer could spend.(2)
(2)Mine wages, by providing farmers with an 
independent source of cash income, provided something of a 
counterweight to the necessity for traders to pay high 
prices for agricultural goods. This made it sensible for 
traders to extract some monopsony profit from growers. 
Since the miners were mobile and could potentially "shop 
around", wages also provided the miners with the 
possibility of evading the traders' extraction of monopoly 
profit. These two factors were minimised in importance by 
the action of the largest, dominant trader in Lesotho who 
sought to capture the monopoly profits at the South African 
mine head. Frasers opened consumer goods outlets at the 
mine compounds and pursued a number of highly effective 
methods at building strong consumer loyalty (amongst which
8
If the farmer could be prevented or discouraged from 
"shopping around" for his consumer goods, the trader 
could earn monopoly profits from this end of the trading 
relationship. Most of the competitive constraints listed 
above operated just as effectively to reinforce the 
trader's monopoly as his monopsony position. Especially 
effective were restrictive licensing, script payment, and 
debt obligations.
Thus, although the trader had a monopsony in 
agricultural commodity purchases, it was ordinarily not 
in his interest to take advantage of this. Instead, he 
would pay a price close to or perhaps exceeding the price 
that would prevail in a competitive market. It made 
better business sense for him to take advantage of his 
monopoly position in the sale of consumer goods. Profits 
were better made at the sale end rather than the purchase 
end of the transaction.
Most colonial-era studies concluded that trade in 
farm products was, indeed, competitive in outcome (see, 
e.g., Stutley, 1960; Biggs, 1964; Ashton, 1967). In 
addition, traders' accounts note the highly speculative 
nature of the trade, the high marketing costs, and the 
narrow, even occasionally negative, marketing margins 
(see Section VI.A). Traders often complained that they 
made losses on wool and mohair purchases. Such was not 
the case in consumer goods sales, however. Students of 
the pre-Independence marketing structure were in 
agreement that trader's profits from consumer sales were 
certainly "adequate", although probably not "excessive" 
(Biggs, 1964; Ashton, 1967; Tarbox, 1979). Traders 
themselves testify that this was where the profits were 
made.
was the now-distinctive Basotho blanket). Later, when 
there was the possibility that Basotho retailers might 
provide competition in the consumer trade, Frasers helped 
set many of them up in business and then became their 
wholesale supplier. (See Walton, 1958).
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Although increased competitiveness in wool and 
mohair purchasing may have been a necessary reform, it 
was not sufficient. Nor was it likely to have much 
positive impact on growers. Such an impact was dependent 
on changes to alter the monopoly position of traders in 
consumer goods sales.
V. The Present Marketing System
The present marketing system consists of two 
official outlets and one unofficial (and illegal) outlet 
and handles approximately 3,400 tons of wool and 800 tons 
of mohair annually. Each tends to serve a different kind 
of grower and satisfies the different needs and 
constraints of each client.
A. Government Woolsheds
Government operates approximately 90 shearing sheds 
scattered throughout the country. Although these fall 
under the auspices of the Livestock Department and are 
staffed by department employees, responsibility for 
various aspects of shearing and marketing are fragmented 
amongst several organizations. Shearing supervision, 
classing and dispatch of records to LPMS are the 
responsibility of the woolshed supervisor, a Livestock 
Department employee. The determination of shearing 
schedules and the dispatch of wool and mohair to bulking 
sheds are in the hands of growers' groups known as Wool 
and Mohair Growers' Associations (WMGAs).(3) Bulking,
(3)Wool and Mohair Growers' Associations are organized 
with the assistance of the Livestock Department, partly to 
assist with marketing, but principally as a vehicle for 
flock improvement and extension efforts. In addition, they 
articulate their members' concerns to the government 
regarding wool and mohair policy. As a condition of 
membership, wool or mohair growers are supposed to follow 
certain recommended practices concerning flock management 
and improvement. An analysis of 1985/86 LPMS data (Hunter, 
1987: 80-85) indicated that WMGA members had significantly
larger flocks than others marketing through the LPMS 
channel. WMGA flocks had, on average, 42 more sheep and 17
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transport to market and preparation of cheques are the 
responsibility of LPMS. Finally, the actual dispatch of 
cheques to farmers is the function of Livestock 
officials. This fragmentation of responsibility 
frequently results in unnecessary delays in payment and 
makes timely record-keeping difficult.
The number of animals sheared at these sheds varies 
from year to year depending on market conditions and the 
timeliness of LPMS payments (see below), but recently has 
been in the range of 53 to 63 percent for sheep and about 
55 percent for goats (Figures 1 and 2). These animals 
are owned by approximately 35 to 38 percent of the stock 
keepers (Figure 3). The average sheep flock (53 head) 
sheared at government woolsheds is 20 percent larger than 
the national average, as is the average goat flock (31 
head). Both are substantially larger than those sheared 
elsewhere, as Figure 4 makes clear.
After shearing, classing, and weighing a farmer's 
wool or mohair, a receipt is issued against the advance 
(or first) payment by cheque. Although LPMS attempts to 
get cheques to farmers within a month, delays of up to 3 
or 4 months are not uncommon often, as stated above,
more goats. They also earned approximately 20 percent 
higher returns per animal. This was the result of both 
higher fleece weights (a quantity difference) and higher 
wool/mohair prices (a quality difference). Despite what 
appear to be beneficial effects of the WMGAs, they affect 
relatively few wool and mohair growers. According to the 
above-mentioned data, there were only 4329 sheep-holding 
and 2504 goat-holding WMGA members in 1985/ 86. They
represented about 27 percent of the wool growers and 14 
percent of the mohair growers selling through the LPMS 
channel. The proportion of all growers was smaller: WMGA
members represented only about 9 percent of wool growers 
and 5 percent of mohair growers. Because of
disproportionately large flock sizes, however, WMGA 
members' animals represented a rather larger proportion-- 
at 23 percent of the sheep and 10 percent of the goats--of 
the total small ruminant population.
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Figure 1:
Merino Shearing and Wool Sales 
(by location, 1985/86)
Govt Woolshed Govt Woolshed
Home
14%
Smuggler
5%
Pvt Woolshed
32%
Pvt Trader 
40%
Marketing Locations 
(Wool)
Shearing Locations 
(Merinos)
Source: Hunter (1987)
owing to factors beyond LPMS' control.(4) After the 
entire clip has been sold, a second payment may be made 
if the average realized price is in excess of the advance 
price. If it is not, the difference is made up by the 
Stabilization Fund. Second payment cheques, which are 
sometimes substantial, may take a year or more after 
shearing to reach farmers. Farmers receive interest on 
these delayed payments, however. Payment by cheque has 
been found necessary to minimize financial irregularities 
during payout.
(4)Three independent studies confirm these delays. 
See the results of a 1986 Woolshed Survey (Hunter, 1987: 
161), a 1986/87 survey of wool and mohair growers (Crees 
and Grimble, 1988), and Musiyambiri's study (1987: VII.2).
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Figure 2:
Angora Shearing and Mohair Sales 
(by location, 1985/86)
Govt Woolshed Govt Woolshed
5
Home
14%
Pvt Traaer 
39%
Smuggler
13%
Pvt Woolshed 
30%
Shearing Locations 
(Angoras)
Marketing Locations 
(Mohair)
Source: Hunter (1987)
LPMS acts as the growers' agent with the South 
African Wool and Mohair Boards. In addition to the 
functions outlined above, it bulks wool from the 
government woolsheds, arranges transport to South African 
markets, and serves as a conduit for payments. It also
operates a fibre-testing laboratory.
Prices paid to growers selling through this outlet 
are determined by the South African Wool or Mohair Board 
in consultation with LPMS and are gross of all marketing 
costs and levies. These are deducted by LPMS from the
both payments before payment to growers.
Data from surveys of livestock holders conducted at 
their homesteads and at woolsheds reveal that almost two- 
thirds of the respondents listed the primary advantage of
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Figure 3:
Percent of Households Using 
Shearing Locations, 1985/86
30%
Wool Growers Mohair Growers
Source: Hunter (1987)
selling through LPMS to be higher total payment.(5)
In second place, listed by about 20 percent, was 
convenience— the government woolshed was either the only 
outlet or the closest one available. The major 
disadvantage listed, also by about two-thirds of the 
respondents, was slow payment.
(5)The homestead survey was conducted during the 
Winter and Spring of 1985. 537 livestock holding
households selected randomly from all geo-climatic regions 
of the country were sampled. This survey is described in 
Swallow, et. al., 1987, and will hereinafter be referred to 
as the Livestock Holders Survey (LHS). The woolshed survey 
was conducted during the 1985/86 wool and mohair shearing 
seasons. 200 small stock owners were interviewed at 
government and private wool-sheds. This survey is 
described in Hunter, 1987, and will be referred to as the 
Woolshed Survey (WS).
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B. Private Traders
Although the number varies from year to year, there 
are currently a little over 40 private traders licensed 
to purchase wool and mohair. This is less than one-third 
the number operating before government involvement in 
marketing.
Figure  4:
Flock Sizes 
(by shearing location)
animals/flock60 -----------
Govt Wlshd Pvt Traders Home Natl Avg
Shearing Locations
Merinos Angoras
Calculated from  LPMS and 1905 
Livestock Holders Survey (LHS) 
data.
Despite the relatively few private shearing sheds, they 
shear about one—third of the animals owned by about one- 
third of the stock keepers (Figures 1, 2, and 3). Flocks 
shorn by private traders average 22 sheep and 20 goats. 
These are generally much smaller than the flocks shorn at 
government woolsheds (see Figure 4). In addition to wool 
or mohair shorn on the premises, private traders also 
purchase home-shorn fleeces. Although home shearing is 
discouraged (because of problems of contamination of
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fleeces with dirt and difficulties of classing), 
approximately 15 percent of animals owned by 30 percent 
of stockkeepers are shorn at home (Figures 1, 2, and 3). 
Home-shorn flocks (14 sheep and 11 goats) are a little 
more than half as large as those shorn by private traders 
(Figure 4) and tend to be located in the more remote 
areas. For the owner, the cost of driving the flock to a 
shed for shearing is high in terms of time lost and 
distance travelled. Precise data is difficult to come 
by, but estimates are that about two-thirds of the wool 
and one-half of the mohair shorn at home are sold to 
private traders. The remainder may be sold to smugglers 
(see below). Thus, traders are purchasing wool or mohair 
from approximately 50 percent of small stock keepers. 
Their flocks are average to below-average in size.
Although it is not known how widespread is the 
practice, Hunter observed during the course of wool and 
mohair productivity research in 1987/88 that some larger 
farmers divide their flocks for shearing between 
government and private sheds. It seems that one reason 
for this is to take advantage of both the higher payments 
of the former and the cash payments of the latter. Some 
livestock officials have suggested that it may also be to 
spread wool and mohair payments throughout the year. A 
farmer with sheep and goats (about 58 percent of small 
ruminant holders, Hunter, 1989), may thus receive 6-8 
payments per year.
Traders' prices, based on first-payment prices 
announced by the South African Wool or Mohair Boards, are 
gazetted by Government after
a committee of traders and government officials agree on 
the allowable marketing margin. In the event of 
disagreement, Government has the last word. This margin 
makes allowances for transportation and handling charges, 
shed operation and depreciation, and commission (profit 
mark-up). In addition, since traders pay cash upon sale, 
their marketing margin also includes an allowance for the
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cost of financing the purchase in advance of sale in
South Africa.
The Livestock Holders' Survey (LHS) and Woolshed 
Survey (WS) data on advantages of marketing to private 
traders are more ambiguous than they are for LPMS.
Prompt payment receives a plurality of support in one 
survey but in another, growers list highest total payment 
as being the primary advantage. Finally, many growers 
list the fact that private traders will purchase coloured 
fleeces (government woolsheds will not) or that they are 
the only (or closest) purchaser available. As to 
disadvantages, growers are more in agreement that 
traders' payments are lower.
This seeming inconsistency is explained by the 
different nature of the trader's and government prices. 
The trader's price is a net price and includes all 
allowable deductions. The price paid at the government 
woolsheds is a gross price from which a variety of 
marketing and transport costs are deducted later when 
farmers receive their cheques. Since the gross price is 
higher than the net price, there may be the appearance 
that government prices are higher than private ones. As 
indicated below, however, a comparison of net prices paid 
by both outlets is more ambiguous. In some years, as in 
the early 1980s, there may be very little difference 
between the two. At other times, as is the case 
presently, the difference may be in favor of the 
government price.
C . Smugglers
Before government got involved in marketing and when 
hawkers were still purchasing wool and mohair, most 
smuggling seems to have been done to avoid paying the 
wool and mohair levy. Today, according to the LHS and 
WS, growers have a variety of motivations for selling to 
smugglers:
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1. To avoid costs of driving flocks to shearing sheds 
or transporting home-shorn fleeces to market. In 
this regard, smugglers are fulfilling the function 
formerly performed by hawkers. This motivation 
seems to apply particularly to small flock owners in 
remote areas and to those with a large proportion of 
low-value, off-colour animals.
2. Because smugglers come to farmers and pay cash, they 
may be a particularly desirable sales outlet for 
those in need of ready cash for emergency needs. 
Although traders also pay cash (and higher prices, 
as well), there are transportation costs involved in 
getting it.
3. Smugglers purchase wool and mohair from stolen 
animals (personal communication, L. Moteane and M. 
Machongo). Proof of ownership must be shown to 
market through official channels but not through 
smugglers. Although wool or mohair from stolen 
animals could be shorn at home and sold through 
official channels, selling to smugglers avoids 
possibly incriminating documentation and lowers the 
thief's profile. Survey evidence suggests that 
perhaps as many as 2 to 3 percent of sheep or goats 
may be stolen in any year (Hunter, 1987: 117-118). 
The principal disadvantages listed by survey
respondents are unreliability and small payments. These 
are not surprising, given the nature of the trade.
Because their activities are illegal, reliable data 
on smuggling is necessarily difficult, if not impossible, 
to obtain. Nonetheless, data on the amount of wool and 
mohair characteristic of Basotho producers sold in 
magisterial districts just outside Lesotho provide upper- 
limit estimates of the amount of smuggled clip. By these 
estimates, less than 5 percent of wool (which ordinarily 
has a relatively low value per unit weight) and perhaps 
as much as 15 to 20 percent of the mohair (which 
ordinarily has a high value per unit weight) may be
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smuggled. This may change with market conditions, 
however. The present high wool price, by providing scope 
for a greater margin, appears to be encouraging wool 
smuggling to a greater extent than before. Historical 
data, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggest that 
smugglers are residual buyers whose business expands or 
contracts according to the health and efficiency of the 
two official channels.
D. Summary
The relationships between these three outlets and 
their respective functions and activities are diagrammed 
in Figures 5 and 6. These flow-charts demonstrate the 
interrelations of the graphs referred to earlier. 
(Percentages in the right-hand "pie" of Figure 2 differ 
from those in Figure 6 (marked with an *) because they 
are based on all of the mohair clip, including the 
estimated 14 percent which is double-clipped. Because 
double-clipping is not sanctioned, most of these fleeces 
would be smuggled--although some private traders may buy 
in the off-season, store the fleeces and sell them when 
it is legal).
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FIGURE 5
The Wool Marketing Network
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FIGURE 6 
The Mohair Marketing Network
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Relative Performance in the Marketing Structure
A. Marketing Margins and Profits
There are both theoretical and empirical grounds for 
believing that private traders did not extract monopsony 
profits in wool and mohair purchases prior to government 
intervention in the marketing of wool and mohair. 
Comparison of prices paid to farmers and prices received 
by traders on the auction floors in South Africa between 
1893 and 1933 reveals an average gross marketing margin 
of 5.0 percent for wool and 1.8 percent for mohair 
(Mokitimi, 1988: 91-92). These margins are abnormally 
low because of the impact of heavy losses by traders 
during the early years of the Great Depression. For sub- 
periods , margins were often rather higher. Between 1893 
and 1902, the gross wool margin averaged about 10 percent 
and the gross mohair margin averaged about 28 percent. 
Between 1900 and 1910, the margins averaged 11 percent 
and 13 percent, respectively. Between 1922 and 1933, 
wool margins averaged 8 percent and mohair margins 
averaged -22 percent. Indeed, as Figure 7 reveals, 
negative margins were not uncommon for both wool and 
mohair throughout the period. While marketing margins 
were sometimes high, so were storage, transportation and 
finance costs and the market, particularly for mohair, 
could be a volatile one, with accompanying high risks. 
Although there are problems with comparing an average 
from a highly volatile series with data from selected 
years and one must not draw too firm conclusions, such 
comparison suggests that recent marketing margins may be 
rather higher than earlier. Margins for 1982/83 were 
about 35 percent for wool and 22 percent for mohair, 
regardless of the (official) marketing channel used 
(Hunter, 1987: 166-167). In 1985/86, margins were about
8 percent for wool and 3 percent for mohair for farmers 
selling through government channels and 20 percent and 11 
percent for mohair for farmers selling through private
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channels. Marketing margins may be high because of 
marketing inefficiencies or restricted competition, but 
they usually reflect unavoidable marketing costs. Their 
magnitude inadequately reflects underlying profit levels.
Since government intervention began, two factors 
have operated to enhance the profits of private traders 
dealing in wool and mohair.
1. The first is the reduced number of traders operating 
in this market, a factor which has enhanced their 
monopsonistic position. In addition, traders are 
rather highly concentrated: seven owned 72 percent
of the trading stations handling wool and mohair in 
1986. Although traders now face competition from 
government woolsheds, survey data suggest that these 
two outlets serve different kinds of clientele with 
different needs. Hence, they are not strictly 
competitive. Growers requiring traders' services 
now have to go longer distances to obtain them, if 
indeed they are available in their area at all.
They are, thereby, placed in a less advantageous 
position vis-a-vis the trader. Although this does 
not affect the prices paid for a particular class of 
wool or mohair, it may have an impact on the classes 
into which fleeces are put. Within limits, traders 
still have discretion in classing fleeces and there 
have been numerous claims made, both from survey 
responses and by observers, that traders often 
downgrade fleeces while classing.
2. The second is the guaranteed commission or profit 
mark-up allowed by government. This is in addition 
to an allowance for all legitimate costs incurred in 
marketing.
In the early 1980s, evidence suggests that the net 
prices paid by LPMS and those paid by traders were almost 
identical (see Hunter, 1987: 165). In 1982/83, growers
received 64.8 percent of the gross wool price by selling
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Figure 7
Gross Wool & Mohair 
Marketing Margins (1893-1933)
Years
Wool Margins M B  Mohair Margins
Source: Mokitimi, 1988
to traders and 66.3 percent by selling through LPMS. In 
the same year, those selling to traders and through LPMS 
received 77.8 and 80.8 percent, respectively, of the 
gross price for the higher-valued mohair.(6) This should 
not be taken to imply that the two outlets were operating 
with equal efficiency. Many of the operating costs of 
the government outlets (shed maintenance, staff salaries, 
LPMS operating costs) are borne by Government and not 
charged against wool and mohair payments, as they are for 
traders. If they were, net prices paid by LPMS would 
appear in a much less favorable light. For example,
Crees and Grimble (1988), estimated that the net price 
received by growers selling through government woolsheds
(6)In making these comparisons, farmer or WMGA-borne 
expenses, including shearing costs (applicable to private 
and government woolsheds) and internal Lesotho transport 
and stationery costs (government woolsheds only) were 
factored in, in addition to the usually reported charges.
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in 1985/86 was M 3.08/kg for wool and M 11.95/kg for 
mohair, while for growers selling to traders the prices 
were M 2.75 and M 11.08, respectively. Using their 
estimates for woolshed staff costs but including only 
one-half of their reported budget for LPMS, as explained 
below, there was a 35 lisente/kg subsidy for growers 
selling through the government outlet at that time. Had 
these growers had to bear these costs (as did their 
counterparts selling to private traders), the government 
price advantage would have been completely eliminated in 
wool and reduced by almost 50 percent in mohair. In 
addition, Crees and Grimble estimate that growers selling 
through LPMS have a hidden 4 percent cost disadvantage in 
interest foregone because of delayed payment.
The earlier approximate net price parity between 
traders and government woolsheds appears to have altered 
in the mid-to-late 1980s to the government woolsheds' 
advantage. Between 1983 and 1986, traders' allowable 
marketing charges increased a little over 100 percent for 
mohair and almost 60 percent for wool. The marketing 
charges deducted by LPMS actually declined by 12 percent 
for mohair and by 7 percent for wool during this period. 
Several factors moderate these changes, however: (a)
inflation in Lesotho has been running at the rate of 
between 12 and 16 percent per annum during this period; 
thus, costs overall have been rising; (b) all of the 
costs borne by traders are government subsidies to 
growers marketing through LPMS or are costs borne 
directly by WMGA members; thus they do not appear 
explicitly as deductions from growers' cheques; (c) 
mohair prices increased by 56 percent between 1983 and 
1985 and then declined by 26 percent in 1986; wool prices 
increased by 98 percent between 1983 and 1986; thus, as a 
percentage of price, margins increased somewhat for 
mohair but declined for wool.
25
B. Efficiency Considerations
For several reasons the government woolshed/LPMS 
outlet is less efficient than the private outlet:
1. As previously noted, until recently the prices paid 
to growers using either the LPMS or the private 
channel were almost the same. Yet most of LPMS's 
costs were met by government subsidy. Some of the 
items in LPMS's operating budget have nothing to do 
with wool and mohair marketing. LPMS also organizes 
livestock markets and facilitates hides and skins 
sales; some expenses are for regulatory or 
monitoring activities that would need to be 
undertaken in any case. Nonetheless, since wool and 
mohair marketing activities are LPMS's major 
responsibility, it would seem justifiable to 
allocate at least 50 percent of its recurrent budget 
to functions which are otherwise borne by the 
private sector. In addition, the cost of permanent 
woolshed staff and woolshed maintenance and 
depreciation are borne by the Livestock Department 
and by donors. Summing expenditures from both 
sources and dividing by the amount of wool and 
mohair marketed through LPMS gives a rough estimate 
of the government subsidy paid per kilogram of 
fleece marketed through this outlet.(7) The result
(7)In recent years, the LPMS recurrent budget has 
been about M 7 00,000. Assuming that 50 percent of this 
goes to wool and mohair marketing, this makes a government 
subsidy of M 350,000 per annum. In addition, there are 
approximately 90 operating government woolsheds. Although 
staff size will vary with size of operation, an average of 
three permanent staff are assumed: one supervisor earning
approximately M 2900/year, one recorder earning 
approximately M 3000/year, and one classer earning 
approximately M 2400/year. In addition, sheds employ 
temporary classers during the shearing season. An average 
of one per shed, employed for a little more than 5 months 
per year at M 6.88 per day, is assumed. This makes a 
payroll of M 747,600 for permanent staff and M 100,000 for 
temporary employees (we are indebted to P. Makoanyane, 
LPMS, for helping with these estimates). In sum, a total 
subsidy of M 1,197,600 is provided to growers marketing
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is about 52 cents per kilogram, or between 10 and 15 
percent of the recent price for wool and between 5 
and 15 percent of the recent price for mohair. Were 
these costs to be borne by growers, the price 
advantage of the LPMS outlet would be entirely 
eliminated and it is likely that many fewer growers 
would make use of this outlet.
2. With the exception of temporary classers, who are 
hired for the shearing season, and shearers, who are 
self-employed, all government woolshed employees are 
full-time staff. Many of the government woolsheds 
are used only a few months a year, however, and even 
the busiest are used for only 8 to 9 months. During 
the remaining months, the woolshed is idle and the 
two or three permanent employees at each have little 
to do. Not only do private traders usually have a 
longer shearing season, but they also have greater 
flexibility to reassign their facilities and 
employees to other tasks during the idle months. 
Thus, the government woolsheds are using labour less 
efficiently.
3. Since private traders' woolsheds average a much 
higher volume than government woolsheds, overhead 
costs are more widely spread and are cheaper per 
kilogram of shorn wool or mohair.
C. Equity Considerations
Government woolsheds serve slightly more than a 
third of growers. Their flocks are rather larger than 
average and much larger than those of growers selling 
elsewhere. As discussed above, growers marketing through 
this outlet have a number of marketing and overhead costs 
subsidized by government and, in addition, have recently
through the government-LPMS outlet. Dividing this by the 
amount of wool (about 1,870,000 kg.) and mohair (440,000 
kg. ) sold through this outlet, gives the annual average 
subsidy of about 52 lisente per kg.
27
received higher net prices than growers marketing to 
private traders. Thus, the substantial government 
subsidies are going to larger growers. This would seem 
to be undesirable from the standpoint of equity.
D. Differences in Wool and Mohair Quality
Some have argued that the quality of wool and mohair 
fleeces shorn at private woolsheds is poorer than that 
shorn at government woolsheds and that this 
counterbalances the seemingly less equitable treatment of 
farmers patronizing private traders. The evidence does 
not support this argument. Data recently gathered 
jointly by the Land Conservation and Range Development 
Project, the Lesotho Agricultural Production and 
Institutional Support Project and LPMS (Hunter, 
forthcoming) shed light on this matter. Despite the fact 
that wool and mohair fleece weights of government 
woolshed-shorn adult animals are significantly heavier 
(by .55 kg for wool and .06 kg for mohair), there are few 
other significant consistent differences between the two 
outlets. For wool, differences in crimps/inch, yield and 
fibre diameter were insignificant at the 5 percent 
confidence level. Staple length was significant but the 
average government woolshed advantage was only 4 
millimetres. For mohair, yield and fibre diameter were 
insignificant while staple lengths were, again, 
significantly different. In this case, however, the 
advantage was approximately one millimetre to the private 
woolshed-shorn goat. Data were also gathered on faults,
i. e. fleeces that were so kempy or hairy as to be 
virtually valueless. For wool, 3.9 percent of adult 
fleeces shorn at private woolsheds were faulty while only 
1.3 percent shorn at government woolsheds were. The 
situation was almost exactly the opposite for mohair, 
however: 3.6 percent of adult fleeces shorn at
government woolsheds while only 2.1 percent shorn at 
private woolsheds were faulty. In sum, there is no
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convincing evidence for a significant, unambiguous 
difference in the quality of the average fleece shorn at 
the two outlets.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
The above review of the evolution of the wool and 
mohair marketing structure reveals that private traders 
did indeed hold a relative monopsony/monopoly position in 
the market and were able to earn monopoly profits from 
the trade. On both theoretical and empirical grounds, 
however, there are reasons to believe that this was not 
earned in the wool and mohair side of the transaction, 
but in the sale of consumer goods to growers. All 
reforms to the wool and mohair marketing structure since 
the 1950s have been predicated on the premise that the 
wool and mohair trade needed to be made more competitive. 
Whatever the merit of that premise, because the source of 
profit was incorrectly identified, these reforms have had 
little positive impact on the problem. Indeed, 
government intervention now guarantees traders a profit 
from wool and mohair sales where none was guaranteed (or, 
at times, earned) before. As well, several ineficiencies 
and adverse equity effects have been introduced into the 
system. It is evident that where monopsony/monopoly 
conditions prevail, increased competition in the 
purchasing side of the transaction is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for the reduction of excess 
profits.
Increased competition in the sale of consumer goods 
at the wholesale and retail level is also necessary if 
excess profits are to be reduced. In this regard, 
government retailers and wholesalers are rarely any more 
effective than product marketing agencies. In pre- 
Independence Lesotho, restrictive licensing, high capital 
requirements, and certain anti-competitive practices of 
traders all contributed to problems in this area. All of 
these could have been dealt with by government short of
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actually involving itself in marketing. The restricted 
traders license (which permitted trade in everything but 
wool and mohair) went some way towards overcoming the 
high capital requirements of trading and attracted many 
aspirant Basotho traders. Special or subsidized credit 
provisions could also have been provided. The hawker's 
license also helped to increase competition. In 
addition, elimination of anti-competitive licensing 
restrictions and government policing of anti-competitive 
practices could have increased competition short of 
direct government involvement in marketing. The dramatic 
increase in mine wages in the 1970s stimulated many 
Basotho to invest in small rural shops. This 
proliferation of rural outlets further increased 
competition in retail trade.
From the standpoints of both efficiency and equity, 
most of the product marketing should have been left to 
the private traders. As with retail trade, competition 
could have been encouraged by facilitating the 
participation of new entrants in the market. If special 
provision had been made for Basotho entrants, this could 
have lessened the European predominance in trading, as 
well.
What of the future? There are several opportunities 
for continued institutional development and reform. At a 
minimum, the fragmented responsibility for marketing 
whereby some functions are undertaken by the Livestock 
Department and others by LPMS should be ended. This 
leads to payment delays, lack of proper accountability 
and, ultimately, to inefficiency. Unifying these 
functions under LPMS would substantially lessen these 
problems. Steps should also be taken to fully charge 
users of government woolsheds for the services provided 
to them. This would eliminate most of the inequity of 
government subsidies being paid to larger, and more 
prosperous, stockowners.
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While these reforms would go far towards eliminating 
the inefficiencies and inequities of the present system, 
for reasons outlined above, it is unlikely that 
government or parastatal woolsheds can operate as 
efficiently as private woolsheds. Thus, serious 
consideration should be given to returning much of the 
wool and mohair marketing to the private sector. The 
government would still have a role to play in the wool 
and mohair marketing system, but it would be concentrated 
more on regulating, monitoring and facilitating the 
efficient operation of the private marketing system. In
addition to the regulatory functions presently 
undertaken, government should:
1. provide a regulatory function to police anti­
competitive and dishonest practices and to ensure 
that minimum standards in grading and packaging are 
maintained;
2. establish procedures for revoking wool and mohair
licenses of traders who are persistent in these 
practices and in non-compliance with these 
standards;
3. provide a monitoring function to gather and analyze
data relating to wool and mohair production and 
marketing so as to keep the industry abreast of 
trends and developments and to provide guidance to 
government's livestock development programs;
4. operate a market information service to keep farmers 
apprised of market prices;
5. train and certify wool and mohair classers;
6. represent Lesotho's interests on the South African
Wool and Mohair Boards, in STABEX determinations, on 
the International Wool Secretariat, the 
International Mohair Association and other relevant 
bodies.
While this shift of emphasis is important to a more 
efficient and equitable marketing structure, the 
government may, nonetheless, find it justifiable to
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operate some marketing outlets, particularly in areas 
where, for reasons of high cost, private buyers are 
unwilling to operate. In this regard, implicit subsidies 
may be justified in order to extend marketing facilities 
to all growers.
Those shearing sheds for which continued government 
operation are not justified might be leased to private 
buyers. If preference were given to smaller Basotho 
buyers, this could be a means by which small operators 
with smaller amounts of capital could get into the 
business and could significantly increase the larger 
traders' competition. It would also help eliminate some 
of the apparent injustices of the pre-Independence 
system.
Because smuggling is illegal, government assessments 
of the marketing system often ignore the role of 
smugglers. Officials ignore smugglers at their peril, 
however. Many growers consider the smuggler a very real 
alternative marketing outlet and are prepared to utilize 
him when official outlets are unable to meet their 
marketing needs. In this way, smugglers are not only a 
bellwether of the marketing system but a last resort for 
some growers.
Survey data suggest that many of the functions 
currently performed by smugglers were previously 
performed by hawkers. Consideration should, therefore, 
be given to relicensing itinerant buyers. They could 
operate as agents of established traders or, perhaps, 
independently. Relicensing such buyers to purchase wool 
and mohair should lessen much of the attraction of 
smuggling by providing legitimate competition to 
smugglers.
Finally, the competitiveness of any marketing system 
is enhanced by knowledgeable producers and consumers. In 
this regard, continued training of wool and mohair 
producers in standards of classing can only help to 
improve their competitive bargaining position vis-a-vis
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buyers and help guard them from being taken advantage of 
during classing.
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